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This paper estimates the magnitudes of government spending and tax multipliers within a
regime-switching framework for the U.S. economy during the period 1949:1–2006:4. Our
results show that the magnitudes of spending multipliers are larger during periods of low
economic activity, while the magnitudes of tax multipliers are larger during periods of high
economic activity. We also show that the magnitudes of ﬁscal multipliers got smaller for
episodes of low growth, while they got larger for episodes of high growth in the post
1980 period. Analyzing the effects of government spending and taxes on consumption
and investment spending indicates that the magnitude of the effects of ﬁscal shocks on
consumption and investment is very small.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The role of ﬁscal policy in stabilizing business cycles came under scrutiny by researchers and policymakers about three
decades ago. As argued by Beetsma and Guilidori (2011), expansionary ﬁscal policies implemented in response to oil price
shocks did not provide the desired results and therefore raised concerns regarding the efﬁciency of ﬁscal policy during busi-
ness cycles. Moreover, ﬁscal consolidations in Europe during the 1980s, contrary to Keynesian wisdom, led to an increase in
output in the short-run and in the long-run and therefore led economists and policymakers to question the established
theories regarding ﬁscal policy. Recent studies, including Alesina et al. (2002) explain this puzzling result with the fact that,
certain ﬁscal shocks, namely shocks to government wages and salaries, can have non-Keynesian effects. They show that
negative shocks to government wages and salaries result in an increase in economic activity both in the short-run and in
the long-run by decreasing labor demand and wages, and therefore increasing business proﬁts and investment.
With the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 turning into a global recession, there has been a revival of interest in the effects of
ﬁscal policy on major macroeconomic variables. Especially in the U.S., with President Obama’s ﬁscal stimulus package, therennheim,
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consolidations in many countries pushed economies deeper into recession, quite differently from what we observed in
the 1980s.This particular observation certainly suggests that the magnitude- and even the sign- of ﬁscal multipliers might
change during the business cycle.
There are different approaches in estimating tax and spending multipliers, but the two most common approaches employ
structural macroeconometric models or vector autoregressive (VAR) models. Among these two approaches, the VAR models
occupy a more prominent role in the recent literature.
The studies using VARs identify ﬁscal shocks either by employing the structural VAR approach or the narrative approach.
The structural VAR approach uses either economic theory or institutional information to identify the variance/covariance
matrix, and therefore the ﬁscal innovations (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2002). The multipliers estimated with this
approach are close to (in most cases less than) unity. Perotti (2002) also argues that the tax multipliers tend to be negative
but small, despite some evidence on positive tax multipliers. Finally, he argues that the U.S. is an outlier in many dimensions,
so the responses to ﬁscal shocks estimated on U.S. data are often not representative of the average OECD country. Most VAR
studies reach the conclusion that the post-1980 ﬁscal multipliers are smaller (Perotti, 2002; Favero and Giavazzi, 2009). This
particular result is generally interpreted as ﬁscal policy becoming more ineffective over the years – most probably due to
increased labor and capital mobility.
The narrative approach, identiﬁes exogenous ﬁscal shocks by a narrative based dummy (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998) or the
defense news measure (Ramey, 2011) or the exogenous tax measure (Romer and Romer, 2010a). While Ramey and Shapiro,
1998) use large exogenous increases in defense spending, like the VietnamWar, the Korean War and the Carter-Reagan mili-
tary build-up to identify shocks to ﬁscal policy and Ramey (2011) constructs a new defense news variable which measures
the present discounted value of expected change in military spending, Romer and Romer (2010b) use information from the
ofﬁcial U.S. budget documents to classify exogenous tax changes. Ramey (2011) estimates the spending multipliers to be
between 0.6 and 1.2, while Romer and Romer (2010a) ﬁnd that an exogenous tax increase of 1% of GDP lowers real GDP
by almost 3%.
Among the more recent studies that do not use VARs, Barro and Redlick (2011) estimate defense spending multipliers
with two-stage least squares, using annual data for different samples where the estimated multipliers lie between 0.6
and 0.7.
The approaches mentioned above, with the exception of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), employ linear models in
estimating the tax and spending multipliers. A common characteristic of these studies is that the magnitude of the multipli-
ers does not vary over the business cycle. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) employ a regime switching VAR where tran-
sitions across recessions and expansions are smooth. By imposing the restriction that the U.S. economy is in recession 20 % of
the time, they estimate that the total spending multiplier is 0.57 during expansions and 2.45 during recessions, while the
defense spending multiplier is 0.8 during expansions and 3.56 during recessions.
In this paper, we investigate empirically whether ﬁscal multipliers are quantitatively different in magnitude during ‘‘good
times’’ and ‘‘bad times’’. To do so, we use a multiple regime framework ﬁrst suggested by Hamilton (1989). We contribute to
the literature by estimating a non-linear model within a Markov-switching framework and obtaining government spending
and tax multipliers during periods of low and high levels of economic activity. Our paper differs from Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) in two respects. First, the Markov switching model that we employ has different properties from
the STVAR model used by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). The model employed in this paper provides additional infor-
mation as it estimates the transition probabilities (the probability of staying in each of the two regimes, low economic activ-
ity and high economic activity). Second, government spending multipliers are identiﬁed from variations in the defense news
variable constructed by Ramey (2011) and the tax multipliers are identiﬁed from the exogenous tax variable constructed by
Romer and Romer (2010a).
Ramey (2011) shows that defense spending accounts for almost all of the volatility of government spending, but also
argues that shocks to government spending or defense spending can be anticipated ahead of actual spending. This has impor-
tant implications because anticipated future changes in government spending can affect current economic activity. She
shows that the standard VAR shocks do not reﬂect news about defense spending accurately and that the Ramey–Shapiro
war dates Granger-cause the VAR shocks. Ramey (2011) also acknowledges that the simple dummy variable approach does
not exploit the potential quantitative information available regarding the news about military spending and for this purpose
constructs a new measure of defense news variable, which reports the anticipated changes in defense spending. We use this
measure to identify shocks to government spending and to calculate the spending multipliers.
One major obstacle in calculating tax multipliers is endogeneity. As GDP increases, we observe an increase in tax revenues
and vice versa. This makes the calculation of tax multipliers very difﬁcult. Romer and Romer (2010b) argue that most
changes in revenues are endogenous responses to non-policy developments. They analyze federal tax actions from 1945
to 2007 and identify four categories. Of these four categories, spending-driven and countercyclical tax changes are deﬁned
as endogenous tax changes, while deﬁcit-driven long-run tax changes are categorized as exogenous tax changes. We use the
exogenous tax changes in estimating the tax multipliers.
The non-linear model employed in this paper separates periods of high and low states of the world for the endogenous
variable (the change in real GDP per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, which can also be inter-
preted as per capita growth), and therefore allows us to estimate separate ﬁscal multipliers for periods of low growth, and
periods of high growth. We ﬁnd that the spending multiplier is 2.91 for periods of low growth and 0.13 for periods of high
K. Peren Arin et al. / Journal of Macroeconomics 44 (2015) 303–311 305growth, while the tax multiplier is 0.19 for periods of low growth and 0.66 for periods of high growth. Our results show
that the magnitudes of the spending multipliers are larger during episodes of low growth, while the magnitudes of tax
multipliers are larger during episodes of high growth – a result that emphasizes the importance of non-linearities for ﬁscal
multipliers. Moreover, the non-linear framework used in this study provides larger multipliers for periods of high growth
and smaller multipliers for periods of low growth during the post-1980 era when compared to the whole sample period,
which indicates that previous ﬁndings about the post-1980 multipliers might be biased since they do not differentiate
between different states of the economy.
As a further analysis, we investigate how changes in government spending and taxes affect investment and consumption
spending. Our results indicate that consumption spending rises during episodes of low economic activity and falls during
times of high economic activity, but only the rise in consumption during times of low economic activity is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level. Investment spending falls in response to an increase in government spending during episodes of both
low and high economic activity. However, only the decline in investment during periods of low economic activity is margin-
ally signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd that both consumption and investment spending fall in response to an increase in exogenous taxes
during both episodes of low and high economic activity, but none of the parameter estimates is statistically signiﬁcant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodology employed in the paper. Section 3
presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 4 concludes.2. Methodology
We propose an alternative way of detecting the causality dynamics between lagged ﬁscal policy instruments and eco-
nomic growth. The regime-switching model considered in this paper1 allows for shifts in the mean, for periods of high eco-
nomic growth and low economic growth, and is given by:1 Theyt ¼ lðstÞ þ
X4
i¼1
ciyti þ b1ðstÞxt1 þ b4ðstÞzt1 þ b6ðstÞwt1 þ rðstÞet; ð1ÞlðstÞ ¼
X2
i¼1
lðiÞ1fst ¼ ig; rðstÞ ¼
X2
i¼1
rðiÞ1fst ¼ ig; t 2 Tð Þwhere yt = change in real GDP per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, xt = real present dis-
counted value of expected change in defense spending per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous per-
iod, zt = change in real exogenous tax liabilities per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, and
wt = squared government bonds spread. Given that st is unobserved, estimation of (1) requires restrictions on the proba-
bility process governing st; it is assumed that st follows a ﬁrst-order, homogeneous, two-state Markov chain. This means
that any persistence in the state is completely summarized by the value of the state in the previous period. Therefore,
the regime indicators stf g are assumed to form a Markov chain on S with transition probability matrix P0 ¼ ½pij22,
wherepij ¼ Prðst ¼ jjst1 ¼ iÞ; i; j 2 S; ð2Þand pi1 ¼ 1 pi2 i 2 Sð Þ, where each column sums to unity and all elements are non-negative. The probability law that gov-
erns these regime changes is ﬂexible enough to allow for a wide variety of different shifts, depending on the values of the
transition probabilities. For example, values of pii i 2 Sð Þ that are not very close to unity imply that structural parameters are
subject to frequent changes, whereas values near unity suggest that only a few regime transitions are likely to occur in a
relatively short realization of the process. fetg are i.i.d. errors with EðetÞ ¼ 0 and Eðe2t Þ ¼ 1. fstg are random variables in
S ¼ f1;2g that indicate the unobserved state of the system at time t. It is assumed that fetg and fstg are independent.
Also, note that the independence between the sequences fetg and fstg implies that regime changes take place independently
of the past history of fytg.
We are interested in documenting estimates of the low–high phase growth rates, ll and lh, but mainly in investigating
the extent to which ﬁscal policy instruments are associated with the low–high phase growth rates. Autoregressive terms (up
to four lags) are also considered. Therefore, the parameters vector of the mean equation 1ð Þ is deﬁned by lðiÞ i ¼ 1;2ð Þ, which
are real constants. The autoregressive terms
P4
i¼1ci; b1 ¼ bl1; bh1
 
; b4 ¼ bl4; bh4
 
, and b6 ¼ bl6; bh6
 
measure the impact of
change in real government purchases per capita, average marginal tax rate, and squared spreads respectively. The parameter
vector is estimated by maximum likelihood. The density of the data has two components, one for each regime, and the log-
likelihood function is constructed as a probability weighted sum of these two components. The maximum likelihood estima-
tion is performed using the EM algorithm described by Hamilton (1989, 1990).model is based on the Markov switching representation proposed by Hamilton (1989, 1990).
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3.1. Data
The variables employed in this paper consist of the change in real GDP per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the
previous period ðytÞ, the real present discounted value of expected change in defense spending per capita scaled by the real
GDP per capita of the previous period ðxtÞ, the change in real exogenous tax liabilities per capita scaled by the real GDP per
capita of the previous period ðztÞ, and squared government bonds spread ðwtÞ. These variables are constructed as follows:
yt = (Change in Nominal GDP scaled by Nominal GDP of the previous period/GDP Deﬂator)/Total Population, including
armed forces overseas;
xt = (Nominal present discounted value of expected change in defense spending scaled by nominal GDP of the previous
period/GDP Deﬂator)/Total Population, including armed forces overseas;
zt = (The change in nominal exogenous tax liabilities scaled by nominal tax liabilities of the previous period/GDP
Deﬂator)/Total Population, including armed forces overseas;
wt = Spread between long-term government bonds interest rate and 3-Month Treasury Bill rate.
We added squared government bond spread as an indicator of monetary credit conditions, following Barro and Redlick
(2011). Since the spread is endogenous with respect to GDP growth, its lagged value is used rather than its current value.
As indicated by Barro and Redlick (2011), if the yield spread is thought as analogous to a distorting tax rate, then the square
of the spread approximates the deadweight loss from the distortion.
Nominal GDP and the GDP deﬂator are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and interest rates are from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Nominal present discounted value of expected change in defense spending and
total population, including armed forces overseas are from Ramey (2011) and the change in nominal exogenous tax liabilities
are from Romer and Romer (2010b). Summary statistics for the variables considered are reported in Table 1. Our dataset cov-
ers 1949:1–2006:4 (quarterly) for a total of 232 observations.
3.2. Results
The null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of Markov regime switching cannot be tested directly using the
standard likelihood ratio (LR) test. We properly test for multiple equilibria (more than one regime) against linearity using
the Hansen’s standardized likelihood ratio test (1992, 1996). The value of the standardized likelihood ratio statistics and
related P-values (Table 1) under the null hypothesis (see Hansen, 1992, 1996) for details) provides strong evidence in favor
of a two – state Markov mean–variance regime-switching speciﬁcation.2
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the model described above are reported in Table 2. The model appears to be well
identiﬁed, parameters are signiﬁcant, and the standardized residuals exhibit no signs of linear or nonlinear dependence
(Ljung–Box statistics for dependency in the ﬁrst moment and for heteroskedasticity). The periods of high and low economic
growth seem to be accurately identiﬁed by the ﬁlter probabilities, which clearly separates the two regimes.
Fig. 1 shows the plots for change in real GDP per person scaled by real GDP per person of the previous period, yt , and its
corresponding estimated ﬁlter probabilities. Peaks and troughs selected are consistent with the ofﬁcial NBER recession/
expansion dates, with the only exception of the November 1973:4 peak. In deriving the results, several hypotheses are inves-
tigated: the effect of policy instruments in periods of ðiÞ low growth bl1 ¼ 0; bl4 ¼ 0; bl6 ¼ 0
 
and ðiiÞ high growth
bh1 ¼ 0; bh4 ¼ 0; bh6 ¼ 0
 
. Furthermore, by means of Akaike criterion, an autoregressive of order one was selected for yt show-
ing a positive effect ðc1 ¼ 0:249Þ. From the results reported in Table 2, the following points are noteworthy.
As documented in Table 2, the spending multiplier is estimated as 2:907 for periods of low growth and 0:131 for periods
of high growth for the entire sample starting in 1949:1 and ending in 2006:4. These results indicate that spending multipli-
ers are larger during episodes of low growth and smaller during episodes of high growth.3
Our ﬁndings are in sharp contrast with the empirical ﬁndings of the previous VAR studies that use linear VAR models.
These studies do not make a distinction between periods of low and high economic activity and estimate government spend-
ing multipliers mostly around 1. An exception to these VAR studies is Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), who employ a
regime switching VAR and ﬁnd a government spending multiplier of 0.57 during expansions and 2.45 during recessions.
Even though there are some methodological differences between our single-equation model employing a Markov switching
framework and the regime switching VAR model of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and the way we identify ﬁscal
shocks, both approaches have similar ﬁndings that are in sharp contrast with the previous literature.2 The presence of a third state has also been tested (Table 1) and rejected in favor of a two states Markov process.
3 We used xt1 instead of xt following the empirical literature and in order to compare our results with the previous literature. However, it can be argued that
expected defense spending may have a contemporaneous affect on output. Estimating the equation with xt yielded results somewhat different from those in
Tables 2 and 3. The estimated parameters showing the impact of expected change in defense spending on output were smaller and only signiﬁcant at the 10%
level.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and Hansen test.
Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB
Descriptive statistics⁄
yt 0.0051 0.0112 0.171 4.152 13.974
xt 0.0051 0.0491 10.388 119.241 4799.01
zt 0.0011 0.0142 0.562 4.328 29.297
zt 0.0001 0.0021 2.837 18.666 2683.87
wt 0.0003 0.0002 1.318 4.708 95.404
Standardized LR test Linearity vs two-states Two states vs three-states
Markov switching state dimension: Hansen test⁄⁄
LR 4.365 0.237
M ¼ 0 (0.001) (0.643)
M ¼ 1 (0.002) (0.677)
M ¼ 2 (0.004) (0.690)
M ¼ 3 (0.007) (0.715)
M ¼ 4 (0.012) (0.722)
Note:  yt = change in real GDP per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, xt = real present discounted value of expected change in
defense spending per capita scaled by the real GDP per capita of the previous period, zt = change in real exogenous tax liabilities per capita scaled by the real
GDP per capita of the previous period, wt = squared government bonds spread. zt is the average marginal tax rate constructed by Barro and Redlick (2011).
⁄⁄ The Hansen’s standardized Likelihood Ratio test P-values are calculated according to the method described in Hansen (1992, 1996), using 1000 random
draws from the relevant limiting Gaussian processes and bandwidth parameterM = 0, 1, . . ., 4. Test results for the presence of a third state are also reported.
Table 2
Maximum likelihood estimation results.
Low growth rate High growth rate
Parameters S.E. Parameters S.E.
Sample 1949:1–2006:4
ll 0.001 (0.001) lh 0.004 (0.002)
c1 0.249 (0.101)
bl1 2.907 (0.976) b
h
1 0.131 (0.061)
bl4 0.194 (0.078) bh4 0.663 (0.118)
bl6 1.252 (0.326) bh6 4.574 (1.087)
rl 0.003 (0.001) rh 0.009 (0.002)
p 0.856 (0.362) q 0.883 (0.387)
LBð5Þ 2.475
LB2ð5Þ 4.129 LogLik 745.187
Sample 1980:1–2006:4
ll 0.001 (0.001) lh 0.004 (0.002)
cl1 0.202 (0.085)
bl1 2.471 (0.992) b
h
1 0.143 (0.055)
bl4 0.158 (0.066) bh4 0.692 (0.161)
bl6 1.058 (0.421) bh6 4.292 (1.662)
rl 0.002 (0.001) rh 0.007 (0.002)
p 0.837 (0.416) q 0.901 (0.334)
LBð5Þ 3.491
LB2ð5Þ 4.001 LogLik 266.348
Note: Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (S.E.) are reported in brackets. LBð5Þ and LB
2
ð5Þ are respectively the Ljung–Box test
(1978) of signiﬁcance of autocorrelations of ﬁve lags in the standardized and standardized squared residuals.
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anticipated changes in military spending based on news. As argued by Barro and Redlick (2011), multipliers associated with
non-defense purchases would be more relevant to evaluate ﬁscal stimulus packages, but they acknowledge that these
multipliers are hard to estimate since there is a great deal of the endogeneity between the movements in non-defense
spending and real GDP and therefore they estimate multipliers for defense spending. They argue that the defense spending
multiplier would provide an upper bound for the non-defense multiplier. Our multipliers should be interpreted similarly.
They represent an upper bound for the non-defense multiplier during periods of high and low growth.
As shown in Table 2, unlike the military news multipliers, the estimated tax multipliers are smaller for periods of low
growth compared to periods of high growth, 0:194 and 0:663 respectively. This particular result implies that government
expenditures are more effective policy instruments during ‘‘bad times’’, and taxes are more effective policy instruments
during ‘‘good times’’. However, one should also note that the estimated multipliers are quite small, and possibly cannot
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Fig. 1. Economic growth and ﬁlter probabilities.
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icy is an ineffective policy tool in the long-run. One should also keep in mind that the long-term growth effects of ﬁscal policy
are also well-documented (Kneller et al., 1999, among others).
Another interesting question is whether ﬁscal policy has indeed become less effective in today’s globalized world with
increased labor and capital mobility, as suggested by Perotti (2002). To be able to answer this question, we estimated our
benchmark regression for the 1980:1–2006:4 sub-sample. The empirical ﬁndings, which are summarized in Table 2, reveal
that while the low growth multipliers got smaller (2.471 and 0:158 for expenditures and taxes respectively), the high growth
multipliers got larger (0:143 and 0:692 for expenditures and taxes respectively). This result makes sense as today’s globally
integrated ﬁnancial markets allow capital to move more freely in response to ﬁscal shocks, especially when capital is more
abundant.
3.3. Robustness checks
In this section, we check the robustness of our results by using the average marginal tax rates, zt , calculated by Barro and
Redlick (2011). Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates are reported in Table 3. By means of Akaike criterion an autoregressive
of order one was selected for yt showing a positive effect ðc1 ¼ 0:301Þ. The estimated multipliers are qualitatively similar,
and all of our results remain essentially the same. We should note that the magnitude of the multipliers, with the new
tax variable become slightly smaller.
3.4. Extensions
Another issue that we investigate in this paper is related to how consumption and investment spending are affected by
changes in defense news measure of Ramey (2011) and the exogenous tax measure of Romer and Romer (2010b) during per-
iods of low and high growth. The investigation of this issue is important in evaluating the predictions of the real business
cycle (RBC) theory and the Keynesian analysis.
Table 3
Maximum likelihood estimation results.
Low growth rate High growth rate
Parameters S.E. Parameters S.E.
Sample 1949:1–2006:4
ll 0.001 (0.001) lh 0.004 (0.002)
c1 0.301 (0.115)
bl1 2.632 (1.224) b
h
1 0.103 (0.044)
bl4 0.203 (0.101) bh4 0.702 (0.225)
bl6 1.342 (0.552) bh6 4.226 (1.374)
rl 0.002 (0.001) rh 0.007 (0.003)
p 0.801 (0.323) q 0.841 (0.215)
LBð5Þ 2.771
LB2ð5Þ 3.983 LogLik 718.623
Sample 1980:1–2006:4
ll 0.001 (0.001) lh 0.003 (0.001)
cl1 0.278 (0.116)
bl1 2.244 (1.065) b
h
1 0.121 (0.039)
bl4 0.155 (0.071) bh4 0.722 (0.247)
bl6 1.166 (0.431) bh6 3.691 (1.663)
rl 0.001 (0.001) rh 0.006 (0.002)
p 0.901 (0.422) q 0.877 (0.324)
LBð5Þ 2.992
LB2ð5Þ 4.012 LogLik 287.544
Note: See Table 2.
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wealth effect, which decreases consumption and increases employment. Increase in employment raises the return to capital
and increases investment. According to the Keynesian analysis, an increase in government spending ﬁnanced by future
lump-sum taxes increases disposable income, which leads to an increase in consumption. On the other hand, increase in gov-
ernment spending also raises the real interest rate, which leads to a fall in consumption and investment spending.
The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Fatas and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2002),
Caldara and Kamps (2008), and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) ﬁnd that consumption increases in response to government
spending, while Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside et al. (2004), Cavallo (2005) and Ramey
(2011) ﬁnd that government spending lowers consumption. The common thread among these studies is that they do not
take into account the possibility that the response of consumption to government spending may differ during expansions
and recessions. An exception to this is Tagkalakis (2008) who investigates the effects of ﬁscal policy changes on private con-
sumption in recessions and expansions in the presence of binding liquidity constraints on households.
Using an unbalanced yearly panel data set (1970–2002) of nineteen OECD countries, Tagkalakis (2008) ﬁnds that ﬁscal
policy is more effective in boosting private consumption in recessions than in expansions. Our methodology differs from
Tagkalakis (2008) in two respects. First, we identify ‘‘bad times’’ and ‘‘good times’’ from a regime switching model that
allows for shifts in the mean whereas Tagkalakis (2008) identiﬁes ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ times by extracting the cyclical compo-
nent of real GDP by applying the Hodrick–Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. Second, we use the instruments used and suggested by Ramey
(2011) and Romer and Romer (2010a) as measures of ﬁscal policy to avoid problems related to endogeneity.
We estimate (1) using, in turns, growth rates of per capita real consumption and investment spending as dependent vari-
ables. The data used in constructing these variables are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Maximum likelihood (ML)
estimates are reported in Table 4. By means of Akaike criterion an autoregressive order one was selected for yt showing a
positive effect on consumption (c1 ¼ 0:177) and investment (c1 ¼ 0:115). The estimated parameters for consumption spend-
ing indicate that consumption spending rises during episodes of low economic activity and falls during times of high eco-
nomic activity in response to an increase in government spending. The impact of government spending on consumption
during times of low economic activity is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, but very close to zero (bl1 ¼ 0:048).
The estimated parameters for investment spending indicate that investment spending falls in response to an increase in
government spending during episodes of both low and high economic activity. However, only the decline in investment dur-
ing periods of low economic activity is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level with the estimated parameter being
bl1 ¼ 0:331. These results can be interpreted as weak evidence for Keynesian models.4
We ﬁnd that both consumption and investment spending fall in response to an increase in exogenous taxes during both
episodes of low and high economic activity, but none of the parameter estimates is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% or 10%4 Estimating the equation for consumption and investment with xt yielded results similar to those presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Maximum likelihood estimation results.
Low growth rate High growth rate
Parameters S.E. Parameters S.E.
Consumption
ll 0.004 (0.001) lh 0.006 (0.002)
c1 0.177 (0.054)
bl1 0.048 (0.025) b
h
1 0.080 (0.291)
bl4 0.133 (0.184) bh4 0.589 (2.169)
bl6 2.814 (1.628) b
h
6 8.479 (7.598)
rl 0.005 (0.001) rh 0.017 (0.005)
p 0.744 (0.241) q 0.891 (0.388)
LBð5Þ 4.223
LB2ð5Þ 2.819 LogLik 802.777
Investment
ll 0.003 (0.015) lh 0.010 (0.005)
cl1 0.115 (0.075)
bl1 0.331 (0.175) bh1 0.046 (0.094)
bl4 0.558 (1.901) bh4 5.198 (6.568)
bl6 7.301 (6.032) bh6 9.355 (5.458)
rl 0.031 (0.008) rh 0.076 (0.002)
p 0.812 (0.302) q 0.831 (0.398)
LBð5Þ 2.114
LB2ð5Þ 2.291 LogLik 384.556
Note: See notes Table 2. Sample 1949:1–2006:4.
Filter probability refers to the probability to be in the low regime as a result of parameter estimates reported in Table 2.
310 K. Peren Arin et al. / Journal of Macroeconomics 44 (2015) 303–311level. We have some similarities and differences with Tagkalakis (2008) in relations to empirical ﬁndings on consumption.
We both ﬁnd that consumption increases in response to an increase in government spending during ‘‘bad times’’, which is
statistically signiﬁcant. However, our results indicate that the impact of government spending on consumption is very small
in magnitude. We ﬁnd that consumption decreases during expansions in response to an increase in government spending,
though this is not statistically signiﬁcant. Tagkalakis (2008) ﬁnds a statistically signiﬁcant increase in consumption during
expansions, though not as big as in recessions. We ﬁnd a decrease in consumption in response to an increase in taxes, while
our ﬁndings are not statistically signiﬁcant. Tagkalakis (2008) has similar, but statistically signiﬁcant results. We interpret
Tagkalakis’s ﬁndings as strong evidence and ours as weak evidence for Keynesian models. The differences could be due to
different methodologies and different data sets employed.
4. Conclusion
By identifying ﬁscal policy shocks, using the narrative approach, we estimate the magnitude of ﬁscal multipliers within a
non-linear framework. The empirical results show that the magnitudes of the spending multipliers are larger during times of
low growth, while the magnitudes of tax multipliers are larger during times of high growth. Our results imply that there is a
role for ﬁscal policy as a stabilization tool by using the ‘‘right instrument’’ at the ‘‘right time’’. Another contribution of our
paper is, contrary to the previous literature, to show that multipliers during periods of low growth get smaller, and multipli-
ers during times of high growth get larger in the post-1980 era relative to the whole sample period. This particular result
implies that the comparison of ﬁscal multipliers between periods in linear VAR studies might be biased. Analyzing the effects
of government spending and taxes on consumption and investment spending indicates that the effects are very small.
Further avenues for research may include further disaggregation of ﬁscal shocks to ﬁnd out exactly which budget items
can be used to stabilize the economy during recessions (or expansions). As Perotti (2002) contends that the U.S. is an outlier
in terms of response to ﬁscal policy actions, there is also some beneﬁt applying our framework to other countries, given data
availability.
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